This transcript has been edited for clarity and readability.
Host: Nick Korb, Senior Attorney, Cronjé Incorporated, Windhoek, Namibia (LEX Africa member for Namibia)
Guests: Thiam & Associés, Guinea Conakry (LEX Africa member for the Republic of Guinea):
• Stéphanie Manguele — Managing Associate
• Alpha Haidara — Senior Legal and Tax Advisor
• Saran Kaba — Associate
Welcome and Introductions
Nick Korb (Host) [15:41]
Welcome to the Mining in Africa “Meet the Experts” series. In this episode we travel to Conakry, in the Republic of Guinea, where we are joined by three distinguished members of Thiam & Associés, the LEX Africa member firm for the Republic of Guinea.
First, a self-introduction. My name is Nick Korb. I am a senior attorney at Cronjé Incorporated, situated in Windhoek, Namibia. I am admitted as a legal practitioner in both the High Court of Namibia and the High Court of South Africa, and I specialise in commercial transactions and mergers and acquisitions, specifically in the mining and renewable energy sectors, where I advise local and international clients mainly on cross-border transactions. I have the privilege of hosting the series for this year.
I would now like to invite our guests — Saran, Alpha and Stéphanie — to give a brief introduction of themselves and their role within the firm. Stéphanie, if we can start with you.
Stéphanie Manguele [19:38]
My name is Stéphanie Manguele. I am a managing associate focusing on OHADA law, M&A and project finance. My practice sits at the intersection of international investment frameworks and local legal realities — that means the mining code, the financing constraints, and the things that actually determine how deals work on the ground. Guinea has become a significant part of that work, and it is one of the most fascinating and demanding jurisdictions on the continent right now. I’m very happy to be here.
Alpha Haidara [20:38]
Thank you so much. My name is Alpha Haidara. I am a senior legal and tax advisor at Thiam & Associés, specialising in direct and indirect investment in the mining, energy and infrastructure sectors. I have extensive expertise in structuring and advising on complex merger and acquisition transactions, project finance, legal and regulatory risk management, and the negotiation of project transaction documents. I act as lead counsel on the Simandou project — a USD 20 billion integrated mining and infrastructure development. I began my professional career in Abidjan, where I spent five years advising multinational corporations in the agricultural and infrastructure sectors. I am very happy to be here for this podcast and to share my knowledge of the mining and infrastructure sector in Guinea.
Saran Kaba [22:07]
Hi everyone, thanks for having me. My name is Saran Kaba. I am an associate at Thiam & Associés and a member of the Bar of Ontario, Canada. I specialise in corporate acquisitions, mergers and asset disposals, particularly in the mining and natural resources, infrastructure and telecommunications sectors, and I also have previous experience in real estate law. I have gained extensive experience at Thiam & Associés advising Baowu Steel on the Simandou project, as well as on other notable acquisitions and mergers. I’m very happy to be here, and thank you for having us.
Nick Korb (Host) [23:11]
It’s my absolute pleasure, and lovely to meet you all online. The format for today is that I would like to discuss two main themes, both of which you have already alluded to in your introductions. First, I would like to hear your insights on state participation and the resource nationalism question in Guinea. Secondly, I would like to chat about mining transactions, farm-ins and deal trends in Guinea. I think both themes have pertinent relevance in the mining world as we know it today.
Theme 1: State Participation and Resource Nationalism in Guinea
Nick Korb (Host) [24:10]
Let’s start with state participation and the resource nationalism question in your country. From my understanding, the amended mining code has established the well-known 15% free carried interest in favour of the state, with an option to acquire an additional 20%. Could you please sketch for our listeners how this regime operates in practice, and whether the discipline against dilution has held up in the more recent transactions that you have advised on?
Alpha Haidara [25:00]
Thank you for the question. The Guinean mining code provides the state with a 15% free carried interest, meaning that the state does not contribute capital and this participation cannot be diluted. In practice, investors also need to factor in the state’s option to acquire an additional 20% on commercial terms.
What we have seen in recent transactions is that this structure is generally accepted by investors, but there is increased attention on anti-dilution protection and how future capital calls are managed. Overall, the discipline has held, but negotiations are becoming more sophisticated around governance and funding obligations.
Nick Korb (Host) [26:47]
What would be interesting to me is the discipline against dilution, given the mechanics you’ve described.
Alpha Haidara [27:00]
From a practical perspective, anti-dilution is very important to the state, and in practice investors comply with this discipline. In every transaction, the basic agreement (convention de base) will first confirm the state’s free carried shareholding interest. Then, in terms of structuring the corporate governance, a shareholders’ agreement is put in place between the investors and the state, which strengthens the legal protection of the state’s free carried interest.
Even where there is a cash call or an equity contribution in the interest of the project — and this has been the case several times, for example where the share capital needs to be increased — there is a mechanism to avoid any dilution of the state’s interest. If a share capital increase would dilute the state’s shareholding, the investors are in practice obliged to transfer additional shares to the state free of charge — the price is literally zero Guinean francs. We implemented this several times during the Simandou project.
Nick Korb (Host) [29:46]
Interesting. How does that affect investor sentiment generally? Do you find that investors are quite neutral towards the option that the government has, or is investor sentiment against this mechanism in favour of the state?
Alpha Haidara [30:14]
In practice, across our previous transactions with several mining companies, there has been no major issue, because investors know about this shareholding interest before investing in Guinea. Most importantly, it is included in the basic agreement, which is ratified by the Guinean Parliament as a law — so it is fully enforceable and binding, and investors are willing to comply with this legal framework.
The one area of mild concern is the state’s option to acquire an additional shareholding interest. This is an option, and the project documentation generally confirms it, but for this additional stake the state has to pay a price, which is evaluated by an expert appointed jointly by both parties — the state and the investor. In practice, this additional option is very rarely exercised; the clause is generally not implemented. That may change in the future, given the state’s policy of taking greater control over the mining sector, but based on past practice it is very rare.
Nick Korb (Host) [32:29]
Thanks. To segue into my next question: beyond the statutory free carry, how does the state normally exercise its governance rights at project company level? Does it act through a single vehicle, and what should foreign investors expect in terms of board representation, reserved matters and information rights?
Alpha Haidara [32:56]
In practice, the state typically exercises its rights through a designated entity, most often SOGUIPAMI — the state-owned mining assets company appointed to represent the state as a shareholder in mining projects. Its role goes beyond being a passive shareholder; it is actively involved in governance. Investors should expect board representation for SOGUIPAMI, because the state’s 15% free carried interest allows it to appoint directors to the board. That is the starting point of the governance, and SOGUIPAMI is generally represented in mining companies in Guinea.
The governance structure can differ slightly where, alongside the mining project, there is an infrastructure project handled by a separate project company — as in Simandou, where there is both a mining project and an infrastructure project. In the mining project the state holds its 15% and is represented by SOGUIPAMI; in the infrastructure project, the state is represented directly. So governance can vary depending on whether the project is strictly a mining project or includes infrastructure.
The critical element in structuring governance with the state is to put a shareholders’ agreement in place. Most mining companies in Guinea in which the state is represented have a shareholders’ agreement providing for board matters, reserved matters, unanimous matters and supermajority matters. That governance framework gives the state a degree of control and consent rights over certain transactions, so it is very important that it is well structured.
Nick Korb (Host) [36:01]
Thanks, Alpha. In 2025, as part of my research, I noticed that there was a revocation of fifty-plus mining licences — you’ve got the Emirates Global Aluminium matter and the Axis International claim, a massive USD claim. From a transactional and risk-allocation standpoint, what lessons should foreign investors draw from this enforcement cycle when negotiating new mining transactions in Guinea?
Alpha Haidara [36:39]
This is a very important question. The recent licence revocations and disputes are a clear signal that regulatory enforcement has intensified in Guinea. For investors, the main takeaway is the importance of strict compliance — not just legally, but also in terms of local commitments and timelines. Mining agreements often provide for local commitments and a project timeline, and it is very important to comply with them; otherwise, the state can rely on non-compliance to revoke the mining licence.
From a transactional perspective, we are seeing a stronger emphasis on risk allocation, clear stabilisation clauses, more detailed dispute resolution mechanisms, and greater attention to political risk insurance. Due diligence has also become much more granular. It is essential to keep a close eye on these elements.
Nick Korb (Host) [38:29]
I think that’s incredibly important, and it’s a boost of confidence from an African mining perspective. In Namibia, we have various mining licence holders that haven’t actioned or complied with the conditions imposed on their licences — whether through a lack of capital to develop the project or otherwise. With the limited manpower within our Ministry of Mines and Energy, there is unfortunately a gap where licence holders are tacitly permitted to continue in non-compliance, simply because the ministry hasn’t been able to stay on top of enforcement. So it’s encouraging to hear that there is a bit of a crackdown within your country’s regime, so that mining projects can develop and are placed in the hands of licence holders who will positively advance them.
Alpha Haidara [40:08]
Exactly. Based on our assessment of the recent mining title revocations, they fall into two categories. For a large number of smaller mining companies, the licences had simply expired — the holders had not taken the regulatory steps to renew them, and the titles were held without express renewal from the mining regulator. For other mining companies, there was non-compliance with the mining agreement itself, particularly the project timetable and local commitments — for example, local processing of mining products and commitments to local plants such as refineries.
Those were the two key elements, and they demonstrate that the state is asserting its mining sovereignty over its mining assets.
Nick Korb (Host) [42:13]
Interesting, thanks. My next question: to what extent do your new constitution of 2025 and the broader institutional consolidation under your current president, President Doumbouya — I hope I’m pronouncing that correctly — alter the legal landscape for mining investors, particularly in respect of stabilisation?
Alpha Haidara [42:46]
The new constitution and the broader institutional consolidation aim to strengthen state control and coherence, but they also introduce a degree of uncertainty during the transition phase. For investors, the key question is how existing protections — particularly stabilisation clauses and arbitration agreements — will be implemented and enforced. In the long term, if implementation is consistent, this could enhance predictability; in the short term, there is a need for caution.
The authorities have sought to stabilise every agreement signed before the transition: they expressly adopted an ordinance confirming that all previous agreements will be fully implemented. The constitution has also adopted a new institutional framework that can reassure investors — for example, the protection of property rights has been reinforced in the new constitution. These are key elements that strengthen the position of investors and support confidence in the country.
Nick Korb (Host) [45:05]
And I know you’ve mentioned it, but the Simandou 2040 strategy and the introduction of the Guinea Bauxite Price Index signal a clear policy shift toward downstream beneficiation and price control. How are your clients at Thiam & Associés structuring around these requirements, and is there room for genuine partnership rather than confrontation?
Alpha Haidara [45:38]
The Simandou 2040 strategy and the introduction of the bauxite price index clearly reflect a shift toward greater value capture by the state, particularly through local processing and price regulation. One of the state’s current priorities is sovereignty over Guinea’s mining assets, so it is encouraging mining companies to process mining products in-country, while at the same time seeking to control the pricing applied to mining products. Based on past experience, the state believes it has lost a great deal of revenue on pricing, with multinational corporations at times concealing true prices, so it is moving to regulate. I expect this to be addressed through express regulation from the Guinean state, to better structure and control the prices applicable to Guinean mining products.
There is room for partnership, but it requires alignment on long-term objectives rather than purely extractive models.
Nick Korb (Host) [47:42]
In your view — and anyone can answer this — is what we are seeing in Guinea a structural, long-term recalibration in line with similar movements in Malawi, Burkina Faso and Niger? Or is it a transitional phase that will normalise once the political cycle stabilises?
Alpha Haidara [48:09]
What we are seeing in Guinea is broadly consistent with the regional trend toward resource nationalism, similar to developments in Malawi, Burkina Faso and Niger. Each country has its own dynamics, but in Guinea I would describe it as a structural recalibration rather than a temporary phase. Investors should therefore approach the market with a long-term perspective and a willingness to adapt to a more state-driven model.
The state is working toward long-term goals, and this will be implemented step by step — it cannot all be implemented at once, so it will be progressive. Investors interested in the market should factor in that things will change over time, and integrate that into their business models to be effective in Guinea.
Nick Korb (Host) [49:55]
That’s probably one of, if not the most important strategic question for a foreign investor audience. As a follow-up: if a client asked you today whether to sign a new 20-year mining convention in Guinea on the strength of the existing regime, what would you tell them? And at a high level, what specific contractual protections would you advise be included in the transaction agreements to protect them?
Alpha Haidara [50:46]
That’s a very important question. In terms of structuring, if we were signing a mining agreement today, given the current framework, the first focus should be clear and highly protective stabilisation clauses — covering the economic aspects, including customs and taxes, and, from the legal perspective, providing that the current Guinean mining code will apply regardless of future changes. This will be a hard negotiation with the state, which is currently seeking to limit stabilisation periods, but a stabilisation period of at least 15 years should be achievable, so that any change after signature has no impact on the agreement and the advantages granted to the investor.
The second critical point is regulatory compliance and, in particular, the parliamentary ratification process. Any derogations in the mining agreement should be ratified by Parliament; otherwise they will not be enforceable — even if honoured for the time being, a future government could set them aside. Once ratified, the clauses of the agreement have the status of law and are fully enforceable against the state, which grants real protection to investors. That is critical in negotiations at the moment.
Nick Korb (Host) [53:45]
I’m glad you touched on that — I agree, that is imperative if I’m an investor looking to invest into Guinea.
Theme 2: Mining Transactions, Farm-ins and Deal Trends in Guinea
Nick Korb (Host) [53:56]
On that note, I’d like to transition to the second theme, relating to mining transactions, farm-ins and deal trends in Guinea. Saran, I think it was you who mentioned Baowu Steel. Your firm advised China Baowu on Simandou. Could you give our listeners an overview of how this multi-block, multi-sponsor structure was put together, and the principal legal innovations that allowed competing Chinese, Australian and Guinean state interests to coexist in a single infrastructure project? You don’t need to go into specifics, but it would be interesting to hear your high-level thoughts.
[Editor’s note: Saran Kaba’s response (approx. 55:12–1:00:40) was not captured by the transcription service due to a microphone issue. This passage will need to be transcribed from the audio recording.]
Nick Korb (Host) [1:00:20]
Wow — fascinating, thanks for sharing. It would have been a treat to be involved in a deal as complex as that, so well done for getting it over the line.
Saran Kaba [1:00:51]
I might add that it was all while the state insisted on local content commitments from all of the industrial partners. That was also a major focal point during negotiations, and I think that so far they have been doing a good job of keeping the promises made in the documents signed.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:01:27]
My next question. Based on my research, farm-ins remain a common transactional vehicle in West African mining. In Guinea, given your Article 90 ministerial validation regime for transfers of 5% or more, how do legal practitioners structure farm-in and earn-in agreements to give the incoming investor commercial certainty, without falling outside the boundaries of the consent regime?
Saran Kaba [1:02:07]
An important distinction to make is between farm-ins and actual transfers of interest. A farm-in — sometimes structured as an offtake arrangement — can be done where a third party comes in and is granted rights at different points along the value chain, whether extracting within the mine or handling some part of the logistics, but does not hold shares, has no equity, and does not hold the mining licence. That would not require validation from the ministry, because it is not a transfer of the mining right.
When a transfer of the mining right of 5% or more is happening, however, that definitely requires the Minister of Mines’ validation, and investors are keen to obtain it — because otherwise the transaction remains risky and could be invalidated at any moment. The ministry’s review is thorough, for both direct and indirect transfers, so it is not something that can be waived. In terms of giving security to investors, the structuring is done so that ministerial validation is built in as a condition precedent — whether it’s a joint venture or another form of partnership between the parties, it needs to go in as a condition precedent.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:04:57]
So in the event of an actual transfer of interest above the threshold, you structure that into your transaction documents in the form of a condition precedent requiring validation before the transaction can be executed?
Saran Kaba [1:05:23]
Exactly — and that’s a no-brainer; there is no way around it. And it cannot be a condition subsequent. It needs to be a condition precedent.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:05:43]
And have you seen the ministry, under your current administration, become more or less predictable in its turnaround on these consents or validations?
Saran Kaba [1:05:55]
Not particularly — to my knowledge there is no discernible trend in the ministry’s validation of these transfers. Generally, if all of the required documents — and it is a pretty hefty list — are complete and the transaction is sound, the ministry, especially for indirect transfers, is not particularly draconian in granting its validation. But it is a thorough review that they do.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:06:52]
In the M&A space involving a Guinean mining title, what are the principal due diligence red flags that you would highlight to international investors? In particular, how do you handle the interaction between the corporate law framework and the sector-specific obligations under your mining code? And if you don’t mind, could you also share, at a high level, what the OHADA corporate law framework is, for those of us that have not incorporated it in our local legislation?
Stéphanie Manguele [1:07:37]
Thanks for the question. In terms of structure, we always focus on five key areas, keeping in mind that you must run two separate analyses at the same time: one under OHADA law for the company, and one under the mining code and the mining convention for the asset. These two areas do not automatically align.
First, you need to verify the full history of the mining title and ensure that all transfers — including indirect ones above the threshold — received proper ministerial approval, as corporate restructurings are often done without the required mining consents. Second, you must assess any outstanding local processing or transformation commitments, as these can represent very real financial risks if unfulfilled. In your due diligence, you check whether the target company has committed in its mining convention to build a processing or refining facility on Guinean soil; if it hasn’t done so yet, that is an unfulfilled obligation — essentially an added liability that you inherit when you acquire the company. Third, and one of the most important, is environmental liability, which should be carefully reviewed, as many remediation obligations are not reflected in the company’s accounts. Fourth are community obligations, such as infrastructure or employment commitments, which are usually tied to the mining convention and transfer with the company, so compliance must be checked. Finally, there are tax and customs matters that require close attention before any transaction.
Concerning the interaction with OHADA law: OHADA plays an important role, but it never fully governs the mining side. The OHADA Uniform Act on Securities provides a modern and clear framework for taking security over movable assets, but when it comes to mining rights in Guinea, things become more complicated — a mining title is neither purely property nor purely contractual, and as a result taking security over a mining title is very difficult in practice in Guinea.
To deal with this, practice has developed solutions that must be reconciled with the interests of lenders. The two main solutions are, first, taking security over the shares of the project company, which is easier to structure under OHADA law and still gives control if needed; and second, step-in rights taken directly in the project contracts.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:12:36]
Of the red flags that you have seen in your various due diligence investigations, which one, in your opinion, most often kills a deal versus reprices a deal? Is it historic non-compliance, defects in the chain of title or prior transfer consents, or does it perhaps pertain to local content requirements?
Stéphanie Manguele [1:13:19]
If I had to pick one, I would say it is the title chain. A missing ministerial consent on a prior transfer doesn’t just create a liability — it puts the entire title at risk. Everything else you can price or remediate in the end, but a defective title you cannot fix after closing. The other areas can be fixed after closing; a defective chain of title, and the absence of a required mining consent, is a deal breaker.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:14:15]
Interesting, thanks for your insight. I’ve noted very significant Chinese investor activity in Guinea — including, as your team has mentioned, Baowu, Chalco, China Hongqiao and Winning International. Are you observing similar interest from other jurisdictions, and what is your view on the diversification of the investor base in the medium term?
Saran Kaba [1:15:41]
Yes — China is dominant, as you stated, but Guinea is extremely attractive for a broad range of other investors. That is mainly due to the de-risking that the Simandou project in particular has done for the country. It is such a large-scale, multilateral transaction that the fact it has gone through and is in the operating phase gives many investors confidence that — while everything is not perfect, and a number of things on paper seem risky — it is possible to invest in Guinea, to be successful, and to operate.
So yes, China is broadly there, but many other countries — France and the UK in particular — are becoming more and more interested in investing in Guinea, even if not on as large a scale: investing in more SMEs and medium-sized projects, and doing more of those. The medium term isn’t necessarily China versus everyone; I think it will be China plus a new pool of other investors who have been encouraged by China’s success — most likely especially in the infrastructure and industrialisation sectors.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:18:01]
That’s interesting. So if we look past the Chinese majors — your next dollar of capital — you’re seeing interest from the UK and France. What about Gulf sovereign vehicles, Indian steel and aluminium groups, Western majors perhaps returning under a stricter risk framework, or African institutional investors?
Saran Kaba [1:18:28]
Yes to all of the above — we’ve seen a bit of all of those. Well, I shouldn’t say a little in the case of Indian aluminium! Some are already on the ground, and some are showing keen interest and are in the early stages of conducting their due diligence. All of this, again, is thanks to the encouragement they’ve gained from seeing the success of a large-scale project like Simandou.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:19:10]
And does the diversification you’re seeing translate into different deal structures? For example, do you see more minority stakes being taken up, more streaming and royalty agreements, or more offtake-linked financing, rather than the run-of-the-mill integrated mine-and-infrastructure models you’ve seen previously?
Saran Kaba [1:19:38]
Oh yes, we’re already seeing a lot of those more creative structures — the offtakes you mentioned, we’re seeing a lot more of. People are becoming creative, and it’s allowing different players — not just the majors, but smaller players — to become involved, because there’s so much more to do. Everyone can win now: parts of deals can be subcontracted out to smaller local players, and so on. We’re already seeing that in play.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:20:11]
Interesting. Looking at the financing layer: given that the Simandou project drew funding from a mixture of Chinese state lenders, multilateral institutions and equity sponsors, what are the typical security and inter-creditor challenges that arise under Guinean law, and how have you as practitioners navigated them?
Stéphanie Manguele [1:20:49]
As I said, OHADA law is both a help and a constraint in the mining area. The OHADA Uniform Act on Securities provides a modern framework, especially for movable assets, with clear rules and a regional register. But when it comes to mining rights in Guinea, things are less straightforward: mining rights have a specific legal status under Guinean law, and their interaction with OHADA rules creates uncertainty, particularly on how security is properly created and enforced over a mining title.
In the Simandou financing, for example, this was managed through practical approaches: lenders relied on share pledges at the holding level, which are easier to structure and enforce under OHADA law, combined with step-in rights taken directly in the project contracts. The inter-creditor situation was more complex, as Chinese banks do not usually follow Western-style inter-creditor agreements. This led to two parallel arrangements that had to be carefully coordinated to avoid conflict. It works in practice — but only if the legal structure is designed early, with strong coordination across all parties and jurisdictions.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:22:53]
Thanks for that, Stéphanie. My next question: I read up briefly on the Hillside Triumph acquisition of LafargeHolcim Guinée, on which your firm acted. That’s a high-profile example of foreign investment into adjacent sectors that service the mining industry. Are we seeing a broader trend of M&A activity in mining services and mining infrastructure assets in Guinea?
Stéphanie Manguele [1:23:27]
Actually, that transaction is an early sign of a deeper shift in how investors approach Guinea. In the past, the model was simple: get a mining licence, extract, and manage political risk. Today, investors are thinking more broadly. With bauxite exports reaching record levels and major projects like Simandou accelerating, there is growing demand for everything around mining — logistics, ports, energy, construction and services. This sector offers exposure to the same growth, but with less regulatory risk than owning a mine directly.
That’s why we’re seeing more interest in mining-related infrastructure and services, especially assets linked to projects like the Trans-Guinean rail corridor and port developments. These are closer to infrastructure investments, with more stable returns, and they diversify clients’ exposure. Legally, they are also easier to structure, often using the standard OHADA company framework without the heavy constraints of the mining law — the result is faster, more efficient transactions. Looking ahead, I expect strong M&A activity in these adjacent sectors over the next few years, and the key for advisers will be to combine solid corporate expertise with a real understanding of the Guinean mining ecosystem.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:25:38]
On the Hillside Triumph transaction: was the investment case principally a play on Simandou-driven construction demand, or was it a broader bet on Guinean industrialisation under Simandou 2040 as a whole — structurally tied to downstream refineries, urbanisation and the broader infrastructure?
Saran Kaba [1:27:06]
I’ll step in on that one. I think it was not directly related to Simandou 2040 — it had been in the works for a little while, without getting into detail. It’s more related to a broader move toward industrialisation in Guinea in general. But of course, with the Simandou project also having been realised, it’s a perfect storm.
Stéphanie Manguele [1:27:50]
I would add that the Hillside Triumph investment is not tied to Simandou as such, but it is indirectly connected, in the sense that it benefits from the overall growth of the mining sector in Guinea, which projects like Simandou are accelerating. What it represents is precisely that shift: instead of investing in the mine itself, with all the regulatory and political risk that comes with it, investors are positioning themselves around the mine, in sectors that will benefit from the same growth.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:28:52]
Thank you for that. My last question for today’s session: what deal trends do you and your team anticipate over the next 12 to 24 months, in light of the new constitution, the Doumbouya administration, the Simandou 2040 strategy, and the continued enforcement posture of your Ministry of Mines?
Saran Kaba [1:29:21]
I think we’re already seeing the shift in Guinea’s mining sector from simply extracting and exporting toward, as you mentioned earlier, control, compliance and infrastructure — more whole-package deals, and transformation as well. This is directly linked to the revocation of licences in 2025, and I think investors should expect less tolerance for sitting on dormant permits and for weak compliance with prior commitments — local content commitments, environmental and reporting obligations, and so on. There will definitely be stricter enforcement of the commitments made by partners, as we’ve already started to see.
In light of the Simandou 2040 national development framework, now that the project is operational, the country is focused on putting in place the means and tools for the project’s revenue to benefit the country as a whole. That’s what the Simandou 2040 programme is all about — it’s not about the project itself, but what the project will do for the development of the country. It’s a very detailed programme focusing on education, infrastructure, agriculture and so on. For future investors, I think it would be wise and strategic to look into the Simandou 2040 programme, see where the gaps are and what the government is hoping to accomplish in the near future, in order to determine where they can fill those gaps.
Closing Remarks
Nick Korb (Host) [1:32:10]
Well, what emerges very clearly from our conversation is that Guinea today is neither closed for business nor an open frontier — it’s a market that has decisively raised the bar. Your updated mining code, the recent revocations, the EGA and Axis arbitrations, the bauxite price index and the 2040 strategy all signal, in my mind at least, that the state will enforce its sovereign prerogatives. But Simandou’s first shipment — in December 2025, if I’m not mistaken — proves that world-class transactions can still be delivered. Again, well done to your firm for being integral to that transaction.
The investors who succeed will be those who arrive with sophisticated structures, credible local partnerships with firms such as yours, and a genuine value-addition story — and the rest won’t. From a Namibian firm’s perspective, the work being led by Thiam & Associés is shaping a template that will travel well beyond Guinea. So to the team: thank you for a most enlightening conversation. Before we close, do you have any final remarks — Alpha, Saran, Stéphanie?
Saran Kaba [1:34:05]
My final remark is simply a note of thanks for having us. We’re grateful for the opportunity, and we’re eager, hopefully, to be working with more of your listeners in the future.
Stéphanie Manguele [1:34:47]
If I have a final remark, I would say that in Guinea today, the smartest investors are not just looking at the mine itself, but at everything around it. Projects like Simandou are transforming the entire economic landscape, and the real opportunity is often in the ecosystem — logistics, infrastructure, energy and services. Those who understand that shift and position themselves early will be the ones who capture the most value over the next decade.
Alpha Haidara [1:35:46]
In terms of closing remarks — again, thank you so much for this initiative; we really appreciate it, and hopefully we can repeat it in the future to capture and provide more insight on the development of the Guinean mining sector. In the coming years, the Guinean government will be more focused on local development, because its policy now is to make sure that mining operations benefit the Guinean people. That is very important: local processing of mining products, local content, technology transfer and training for Guinean people are priorities. The country is seeking to take control over its mining sector and to ensure that interests are balanced between investors and the Guinean people — that’s the key element. We are happy to assist investors and your listeners interested in investing in the country; we are open to that, and if you need any assistance, please keep in contact. Thank you so much.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:37:37]
Thank you, Alpha; thank you, Saran; thank you, Stéphanie, for a most enlightening conversation. Before we close, I would like to draw our listeners’ attention to the LEX Africa Guide to Mining in Africa, which contains a chapter on the Republic of Guinea authored by Thiam & Associés and provides an excellent jurisdictional reference for any practitioner or investor considering activity in this market. The guide is available for download, free of charge, from the LEX Africa website at www.lexafrica.com. Alpha, Saran, Stéphanie — would you like to highlight any particular aspects of your chapter that listeners should pay close attention to?
Saran Kaba [1:38:38]
I would highlight the discussion of Chinese investors versus other investors in Guinea, as well as the points on Simandou 2040.
Nick Korb (Host) [1:39:07]
Great — thank you again. I would like to invite our listeners to the next episode in the series. It’s been a pleasure hosting you, and it’s been incredibly insightful for me, representing Cronjé Incorporated of Namibia, to learn more about the Republic of Guinea.
Stéphanie Manguele [1:39:29]
Thank you for having us — it was a pleasure.
